A consensus seems to be emerging in economics that at least three motives are at work in many strategic decisions: distributive preferences, reciprocal preferences and self-interest. An important obstacle to this research, however, has been moral biases, i.e., the distortions created by self-interest that can obscure social preferences. Among other things, this has lead to disagreement about the relative importance of distributive preferences, reciprocal preferences, or both. This paper describes a simple experiment that decomposes behavior into these three forces and examines their interactions without the confounds that have compromised other designs. We compare the decisions of implicated "stakeholders" with those of impartial "spectators," who have no stake. Several surprising and interesting results emerge. For example, we find that stakeholders respond less forcefully to kindness and unkindness towards them than do spectators acting on their behalf. We also find an asymmetry in reciprocity: stakeholders punish but do not reward, whereas spectators both reward and punish. This result suggests that the lack of positive reciprocity found in other studies is not due to an asymmetry in the underlying reciprocal preferences but rather to a moral bias by stakeholders in the application of that preference. More generally, we find that all three hypothesized motives end up having important and significant effects on final allocations.
Introduction
The assumption of self-interest has served as a powerful axiom of economics. It has helped to explain and predict large swaths of observed facts and to develop rigorous and elegant theoretical models. With mounting evidence of behavior at variance with material self-interest, however, economists have increasingly come to embrace the need to enrich traditional models with additional motives. The growing consensus is that integrating such social preferences into the analysis can often explain or improve explanations of important economic phenomena, including involuntary unemployment (e.g., Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) , pricing policies (e.g., Kahneman, et al., 1986b , Kachelmeier, et al., 1991 and bargaining behavior (e.g., Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982) .
Nevertheless, the confluence of the often competing forces of self-interest and social preferences in the laboratory and the field has proven to be an important hurdle to inferring the principles that theory needs to incorporate. Most attempts to identify the distinctive impact of social preferences have been by hindered by "moral biases," i.e., by the transmogrifying effects of selfinterest that insinuate themselves when decision-makers are also stakeholders.
1 What one often observes under these conditions are "double standards," or the phenomenon that can be defined as "a set of principles that are applied more rigorously to one party than to another, especially oneself." Although the existence of moral biases has been well documented, almost no studies of social preferences have disentangled social preferences its distorting effects. This study seeks to isolate experimentally the separate effects of self-interest and resulting moral bias and two major categories of social preferences (distributive and reciprocal). It is distinct from previous work by establishing a benchmark of pure social preferences and by eliminating any explicit role for 1 We should distinguish moral bias from another phenomenon that has been noted in this literature called self-serving bias. Moral bias refers to any effect of self-interest on the observed or reported willingness to act on social preferences. As commonly used, self-serving bias may be thought of as one of two reasons for moral bias. Specifically, self-serving bias is an alteration of one's beliefs (self-deception) about social preferences, e.g., believing it is fair to be unfair in order to relieve the disutility of unfair behavior. Another reason for a moral bias can be deliberately self-interested acts.
strategic behavior, both under various allocation conditions. This permits us to identify each force and the sometimes unexpected interactions among motives.
A watershed event for the study of social preferences in economics was the publication of the Güth, et al. (1982) experimental test of the "ultimatum game," which framed much of the subsequent literature in several important ways. In this game, one player (the proposer) first makes an offer out of a fixed amount of money to another (the responder); if the responder accepts, the money is divided as proposed, whereas if he rejects, both players receive nothing. The pattern, replicated many times hence, of proposers to offer nontrivial amounts to responders and of responders to reject small offers deviated from the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of minimal offers and no rejections. This empirical finding had several effects: it kindled much of the ensuing empirical and theoretical search for social preference-based explanations, it laid the groundwork for the prominent role that the experimental method has played in investigating such motives, and it set the stage for analyzing social preferences in the context of strategic interaction.
Among possible motives, fairness was widely cited from the start to explain the results of the ultimatum game and other experiments. Fairness has usually been understood to mean distributive preferences, which is how we will use the term throughout this paper. Often fairness is equated with equal splits, especially in experiments (e.g., Bolton 1991 , Bolton and Ockenfels 2000 , Fehr and Schmidt 1999 . Additional "anomalies" have also been observed in prisoner dilemma, public goods, gift exchange and trust game experiments, and have been variously attributed to other motives such as altruism (Becker 1974 , Levine 1998 , warm glow (Andreoni, 1993) , spite (Cason, Saijo and Yamato, 2002) , intentions (Rabin, 1993) , and trust and reciprocity (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995) .
More recently, though, the central debate has been over whether social preferences are distributive, i.e., preferences over outcomes or endstates, or reciprocal, i.e., preferences over intentions or player types. 2 To clarify this distinction, consider an example using the ultimatum game, akin to the design of Blount (1995) . Suppose a proposer offers a responder $3 out of a sum of $10. Now compare this with the same $3/$7 division, but suppose it had been randomly determined.
If the responder's preferences were purely distributive and driven solely by, say, an aversion to inequality, she would either accept or reject this offer, but it would not matter whether it was made by a proposer or determined randomly. If, on the other hand, the responder would reject the proposer's offer as unkind but would accept the randomly determined $3, this suggests that behavior is being caused by reciprocity. Specifically, negative reciprocity is manifested when one party punishes another's unkindness, as in this case, and positive reciprocity occurs when one party rewards another's kindness.
A remarkable feature of the ultimatum game is its ability to capture multiple forces in bargaining within the simplest possible structure. A drawback, though, is its inability to identify unambiguously the influence of each of these forces. 3 Most of the research on reciprocity or on its magnitude relative to fairness, therefore, has employed other designs, especially the so-called "trust game," introduced by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) . In this design, the proposer receives a fixed sum of money, any amount of which he may send to a responder. The experimenter triples the amount sent to the responder, and the responder may then send some amount back to the proposer.
In contrast to the subgame-perfect prediction of zero transfers, numerous replications of this experiment show that many proposers send money, and that many responders transfer money back to proposers (e.g. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995, Croson and Buchan 1999) . The latter is sometimes taken as a measure of reciprocity and the former of "trust," i.e., behavior based on expectations of reciprocity. The potential problem with these interpretations is that both proposer and responder transfers might be motivated, in part or in whole, by fairness. For this reason, Cox (2004) introduced a "triadic" design that supplements the standard trust game experiment with two themselves. We will be more specific in our meaning later, but whatever usage one adopts, it is bound to conflict with that used in some important part of this literature.
treatments that are variations on the "dictator game," in which subjects may transfer money to other subjects, but the recipients have no decision. 4 The results show significant evidence of fairness based on the mostly positive transfers of decision makers in dictator-like treatments. Additionally, Cox finds significantly larger transfers by proposers and responders in the trust treatment than among their counterparts in dictator treatments, providing evidence of trust and reciprocity, at least, in the sense we are using these terms here.
The ultimatum game permits only negative reciprocity: the responder can punish a selfish proposer but she cannot, through her choices, vary the reward to a proposer based on the generosity of his offer. Similarly, the trust game focuses on positive reciprocity: the responder can liberally reward proposer generosity but is constrained in punishing proposer selfishness (indeed, a responder is powerless against a proposer who sends nothing). Other designs have allowed expression of both positive and negative reciprocity, including Charness (2004) , Offerman (2002) and Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2000) . Abbink, et al. introduced the "moonlighting game," a two-stage, two-player game. This game resembles the trust game in that a first mover can transfer an amount to the second mover, and any amount transferred is tripled. But the first mover may also choose instead to take an amount from the second mover on a dollar-for-dollar basis. In the second stage, the second mover can then either transfer something to the first mover on a dollar-for-dollar basis, as in the trust game. Alternately, she can spend money to reduce the payoff of the first mover, whereby each dollar spent reduces the second mover's payoff by three dollars. Abbink, et al. find that, in the first stage, most first movers transfer a positive amount, although some take from the second mover. In the second stage, some second movers reward positive transfers from the first stage, but the more pronounced effect is for second movers to take money from first movers who took from them. Similar to this study, Charness (2004) and Offerman (2002) also find that negative reciprocity appears to be a more powerful motivation than positive reciprocity.
With these and other important contributions, the debate over distributive versus reciprocal preferences appears to be transforming itself into an emerging consensus that much behavior can be traced to some combination of these two categories of social preferences plus self-interest, as reflected in recent theories of that incorporate all three motives, e.g., Charness and Rabin (2002) , Cox, Friedman and Gjerstad (2004) and . The current study has two overarching goals that take this view as its point of departure. First, we decompose the motivational forces behind allocation decisions under various allocation conditions into three parts: self-interest, fairness, and reciprocity (including positive and negative reciprocity). Second, we seek individuallevel evidence on the interactions between the three motives. The challenge, which we believe our design overcomes, is to decompose these forces and to identify their interactions without the distortions that potentially plague such measures when multiple motives are activated.
Probably the most significant obstacle to these goals is associated with self-interest, which can have a complex and subtle effect on allocative decision-making. One important reason is that
self-interest appears not only in unmistakable forms but can also mask itself as social preference when strategic interaction is possible. Consider the ultimatum game. The offer by a proposer of a substantial fraction of the available stakes seems like a measure of social preferences. But the strategic design prompts a self-interested reason for generosity: small offers face an increased risk of rejection by responders such that even purely self-interested proposers have an incentive to make more generous offers, suggesting that ultimatum game offers understate the degree of proposer selfinterest. This is consistent with the results of Forsythe et al. (1994) , who find that proposer offers in the ultimatum game are significantly greater than those in the dictator game. Strategic behavior can similarly confound inferences about social preferences in the trust game. Proposers who anticipate sufficient responder reciprocity have a self-interested incentive to transfer money to responders. The inability to read the proposer's motives unambiguously, in turn, potentially confounds inferences about the responder's reciprocal preferences. The responder does not know whether proposer generosity is due to his social preferences, which she would like to reward, or to his self-interest, which she would probably rather punish. It is possible, therefore, that responder transfers understate their true reciprocal preferences. The same potential problem arises with first mover generosity in the moonlighting game.
Because of these concerns, we eliminate any explicit reasons for strategic behavior in our experiment. Specifically, we use a dictator game involving the allocation of $10 between two subjects in the first stage, followed by an unannounced second stage in which either the recipient or another subject allocates $20 between the two subjects from the first stage. We provide the procedural details of the experiment in the following section of the paper, but one important treatment variable concerns the identity of the second stage allocator. In one version this is one of the two subjects from the first stage, whereas in the other version it is a third party, who is paid a fixed fee unrelated to the division of $20 she chooses between the two first stage subjects. In this way, one can distinguish the decisions of an implicated "stakeholder" in a second-person relationship from those of an impartial "spectator" who is expressing pure preferences over the allocations of other persons. This permits us to address a number of questions about social preferences, e.g., the conjecture, implicit in the Adam Smith quote at the start, that reciprocity manifests itself less strongly in a stakeholder than in a spectator.
Another issue this design allows us to address concerns the previously-cited asymmetry between positive and negative reciprocity among stakeholders. One possibility is that this asymmetry is a genuine characteristic of the underlying social preference, i.e., even spectators would reward less strongly than they punish. An alternative hypothesis is that reciprocity considered alone prescribes symmetric reward and punishment but that adding self-interest produces an asymmetric moral bias: stakeholders are more willing to sacrifice self-interest to punish than to reward. In contrast to previous studies, this experiment can distinguish between these hypotheses.
Third party preferences have been found in previous work. Indeed, many of the stories underlying evolutionary economics that support social preferences rely on these types of motives (e.g. Frank 1988 , Boyd et al. 2003 , Güth and Ockenfels 2000 . Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986a) conducted an experiment, akin to a binary choice version of the dictator game, in which subjects are willing to forgo $1 to punish a subject who had been unfair to someone else in a previous decision. In the public goods experiment of Carpenter and Matthews (2004) , many subjects are willing to sanction players in other groups, even at a cost. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) report the results of a series of experiments demonstrating third party punishment when distribution and cooperation norms are violated. These studies provide compelling evidence of the willingness of third parties to punish. They do not, however, answer the particular set of questions we wish to address here and differ, therefore, in several ways. For one thing, their third parties are often stakeholders rather than spectators, i.e., they must incur a cost to punish. 5 This underscores the strength of this preference, but it also opens the possibility of a moral bias in the measurement of this preference. Second, they focus on negative reciprocity, whereas we wish to examine, for both second and third parties, social preferences of all types: distributive, positively reciprocal and negatively reciprocal. Finally, first-stage dictators in our study are never informed of the second stage in order to minimize or eliminate strategic considerations. This design feature is often lacking in previous studies.
Our analysis focuses on the effects of each of the three motives on levels of second stage allocator transfers as well as on their responsiveness at an individual level to changes in first stage allocations. Our design takes account not only of the distortionary effect of self-interest but also attempts to minimize any contextual cues that might activate more complex distributive preferences and, thereby, introduce confounds. For example, Andreoni and Miller and Charness and Rabin have found that, when total stakes are variable, many subjects exhibit an "efficiency motive," i.e., a desire to maximize surplus, even at a personal cost. Subjects have also been observed to respond to a sense of desert when they earn their allocations through a task, as in Konow (2000) , or are led to believe they have earned their allocations, as in Hoffman, et al. (1994) . For these reasons, we use fixed stakes in both stages that were endowed, rather than earned. Moreover, the fact that the second round stakes are double those in the first round gives considerable latitude given to the expression of both positive and negative reciprocity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design and procedures, section 3 presents and analyzes the results of the experiment, and section 4 contains the concluding remarks.
Description of the Experiment

Experimental Design
The experiment is a two stage dictator game. In the first stage, a sum of $10 is distributed between each of two paired subjects in groups denoted X and Y. One treatment variable has to do with the method of this distribution. In the "Group X Decision" condition, each subject in the X group receives $10, which he can divide, as dictator, between himself and an anonymous counterpart in group Y. Each X subject can divide the sum in any even dollar amounts, i.e., there are six possible (x,y) divisions in $2 increments from (10, 0) to (0, 10). In the "Random Division" condition, the $10 sum is divided in one of the same six possible ways between each subject in groups X and Y, but the exact division is randomly chosen for each pair (as in Blount 1995) .
In the second stage, which is not previously announced to subjects, a sum of $20 is divided dictator-fashion between each of the X, Y pairs. The second treatment variable concerns the identity of this second-stage dictator (here called the allocator). In the "Group Y Allocator" condition, each Y subject chooses how much to allocate to herself and her X counterpart from the first stage in any one-dollar increment. The "Group Z Allocator" condition is similar, except there is a third group, Z.
Each subject in that group is assigned an X, Y pair and chooses the allocation of $20 between these two subjects. This Z allocator receives a separate fixed $20 fee for this decision that does not depend in any way on the allocation. We use the strategy method for both of these treatments: Y (or Thirty pairs or triples, respectively, participated in each cell in an across-subjects design. This is summarized in Figure 1 , which also presents the abbreviations for these treatments that we will use. We use the strategy method for second-stage allocations for several reasons. 6 First, it allows us to observe distributive and reciprocal preferences at the individual level. This provides evidence on a variety of questions, including whether subjects differ in their cut-off point between positive and negative reciprocity. Second, it provides a richer set of observations than would be possible using only actual first-stage allocations, particularly since certain divisions are seldom chosen by first-stage dictators. This was an especially acute concern in the case of this experiment, since we sought data on possible positive second-stage reciprocity (i.e., rewards) in response to Group X Decisions that give Y more than one-half, and such decisions are very rare. We addressed concerns about the strategy method in part by simplifying the cognitive task, e.g., by using straightforward and clear wording and procedures. This was also the reason for constraining possible first-stage divisions to even dollar amounts: second-stage allocators needed to make only six allocations as opposed, say, to eleven if first-stage divisions had been in any dollar amount.
Of the four treatments, treatment DY is closest in spirit to the standard trust game. 7 One important difference is the absence of strategic play: in the first stage, X subjects are not informed of the possibility of a second stage, and this fact is common knowledge. 8 Second-stage allocators can, therefore, take first-stage transfers as genuine measures of the willingness of X subjects to sacrifice material self-interest for social preferences, undistorted by X's strategic self-interest.
Another difference is the wide berth given to second-stage allocators to express both positive and negative reciprocity. Assume, for the sake of illustrating this point, that fairness call for equal splits of first and second-stage amounts. Then the second-stage allocator can punish X selfishness (when X retains more than half of the $10 for himself) by withholding part or all of X's $10 entitlement to one-half of the $20 second-stage earnings. Similarly, the second-stage allocator can reward X generosity (when X retains less than one half of the $10 for himself) by bestowing more than onehalf of the second-stage earnings, between $10 and $20, on X. Thus, second-stage allocations in the DY treatment reflect the confluence of three potential subject Y motives: self-interest, fairness and reciprocity, as in the trust game, except that the current design provides evidence of X's social preferences without distortion from strategic interests. This is depicted in Figure 2 below, which summarizes the types of preferences that operate in each treatment. By examining the differences between these treatments we can isolate the various types of preferences in operation.
7 Our treatment, however, involves fixed stakes since no transfers are ever multiplied. In this respect, ours is also similar to the Specific Reciprocity treatment of Ben-Ner, et al. (2004) . Some differences with that study include the facts that their experiment lasted about 2 hours, since the subjects also completed a lengthy survey for which they were paid a separate fixed $15, second-stage allocators made only one choice about what to send after finding out what their firststage counterpart had sent, and second-stage decisions were over the same $10 amounts as first-stage decisions. Our study also involves the three other treatments detailed above.
The RZ treatment is the most basic one in terms of motivation. In this treatment, X subjects make no decisions in the first stage, since the initial division of the $10 is random. For example, two comparisons examine the effects of self-interest. In the RY and RZ treatments, initial allocations are random, and second-stage allocators can act on their distributive, but not reciprocal, preferences. Thus, one can measure the effect of self-interest in the presence of fairness by comparing the differences in second-stage allocations between treatment RY, where self-interest and fairness are potentially in play, and treatment RZ, which reflects only fairness. One can similarly isolate the effect of self-interest when both distributive and reciprocal preferences are 9 One might wonder why we test for distributive preferences in the RZ treatment instead of simply assuming, as we did earlier for purposes of illustration, that impartial distributive preferences reduce to equal splits of the total amount from both stages. Equal split preferences are evident in the results of many contextually lean experiments, e.g., ones with a single stage of decision-making, anonymity, unearned endowments, fixed stakes, and no information about need, merit, gender, etc. On the other hand, other experiments reveal patterned deviations from equality, e.g., Babcock, et al. (1995) , Gächter and Riedl (2001) , and Konow (2000) . Although the current experiment is contextually simple, some design characteristic, such as two stage decision-making, could prime preferences for unequal splits of the total. For example, even subjects who prefer equality might compartmentalize decisions in the two stages, i.e., second-stage decisions might tend toward equality but not entirely adjust for inequalities created in the first stage. Thus, we test for each type of social preference in this study, rather than assuming any specific form.
potentially implicated by comparing treatments DY and DZ treatments. In both treatments, X subjects decide on the first-stage division (potentially activating both the distributive and reciprocal preferences of second-stage allocators), but any difference between the two indicates the effect of Y self-interest (versus Z impartiality), similar to the comparison above of treatments RY and RZ.
The effect of reciprocity can also be identified by two comparisons of treatments. First, second-stage allocators in the RZ and DZ treatments are Z subjects with no personal stakes, i.e., spectators. In the RZ treatment, these spectators can express only distributive preferences given the random determination of first-stage allocations, whereas in the DZ treatment first-stage divisions differ because of X's decision, potentially activating both the distributive and reciprocal preferences of second-stage allocators. Differences in these treatments, therefore, should reveal the pure effect of reciprocal preferences in spectators. Second, the RY and DY treatments parallel the RZ and DZ treatments, respectively, in terms of how the initial $10 is divided. In the RY and DY treatments, however, second-stage allocators are stakeholders (Y subjects) rather than spectators (Z subjects), introducing a role for self-interest. Thus, a comparison of these treatments reveals the effect of reciprocity (i.e., of stakeholders), when both self-interest and fairness are relevant.
Experimental Procedures
After registering, receiving their show-up fee and being seated (randomly, in the case of X/Y sessions), subjects receive a form with the first-stage instructions and allocation information.
The experimenter then reads the instructions aloud. The experiment is run on paper and is conducted single-blind: each subject is identified only by a subject ID, which only he and the experimenter know. Subjects are told that they will never know the identity of their counterparts.
All subjects are provided with the same information, but no one is informed, at this point, of the second stage. In the Group X Decision condition, X subjects choose one of the six X/Y divisions by circling it. In the Random Division condition, one of the lines is already circled on the X forms only.
10 These forms are then collected. Now subjects are informed for the first time of a second, and final, stage of the experiment.
They receive forms with the second-stage instructions and space, if applicable, for decisions. In RY and RZ sessions, subjects are informed that the $10 stakes in the first stage were randomly divided between X and Y subjects. In the DY and DZ sessions, they are told that X made this decision.
Then, the second-stage allocator (subject Y in the RY and DY sessions and subject Z in the RZ and DZ sessions) chooses how to allocate the $20 between X and Y for each of the six possible firststage divisions. These forms are then collected, and, while payments are being calculated, all subjects complete a questionnaire that asks demographic information. Subjects in decision-making roles are also asked why they chose as they did as well as a series of hypothetical questions about how they would have chosen if the first-stage divisions were made under the other condition or if they had been in one of the other decision-making roles. Subjects turn in these forms, sign for payments and are free to depart.
Three hundred undergraduates participated in this experiment with thirty subjects per session.
11
Subjects were randomly assigned to X or Y roles in X/Y sessions; Z sessions were conducted separately with only Z subjects. All decision-making sessions were conducted over a two-day period, and all second-stage allocations were scheduled for the first day to avoid contamination effects. Two sessions were conducted after these two days, and these both involved X and Y subjects in the RZ treatment, who made no decisions. Total average earnings per subject equaled $21, which included a $5 show up fee. Based on sessions that lasted about 40 minutes, average hourly earnings were about $32. At the end of the experiment, 96% of the 293 subjects who responded to the question, indicated that they would be willing to participate in an economics experiment again.
divisions, as is common with actual X decisions. Specifically, the frequency of an allocation with $x in these treatments is .5 (19 3 5 ) f x = ⋅ − ⋅ − , which produces a simple, piecewise linear distribution with these attributes.
11 There was one exception: one group of thirty X and Y subjects in the RY treatment was conducted over two sessions due to an unexpectedly large number of no shows in the first session. Most participants were recruited via e-mail and posted notices around campus to register at a website. A small number was recruited from a campus subject pool, which also satisfied class credit -these subjects were all assigned to non-decision-making roles (e.g., X in Random Division treatments or Y in Group Z allocator treatments).
Results and Analysis
Summary of Results
Our primary interest is in the allocations made in the second stage of decision-making. We note the average first-stage transfer to Y in the Group X Decision sessions was $3.07 (st. dev. 1.92), or around 30% of the available amount. These transfers are comparable to those in other dictator studies.
The decisions of the second-stage allocators are our primary interest, and were made using the strategy method, i.e., for each possible stage one division without knowledge of the actual outcome of that phase. Konow 2003 Konow , 2005 ) that the choices of spectators (here Group Z allocators), in contrast to those of stakeholders (here Group Y allocators), are unbiased and converge, i.e., spectators agree and act on common social norms to a significantly greater degree than stakeholders. ** p < .01; * p < .05; ^ p < .10 We find two significant effects. When X decides the first-stage allocation, he receives significantly less than when the first division is random. As will be shown below, this is primarily due to negative reciprocity, whereby first-movers are punished for low offers with greater frequency and force than they are rewarded for high offers. Second, when Y makes the second allocation, X receives significantly less than when Z makes it. This can be attributed to Y's self-interest: she keeps a larger share for herself, on average, whereas Z treats X and Y more equally. remains. Interaction terms in the other regressions were insignificant even at the 10% level, so these results are not reported.
Regression Analysis of Responsiveness of Second-stage Allocations
The second part of the regression analysis identifies the responsiveness, or slope, of the second-stage allocation to the first-stage method and the second-stage allocator. We calculate these slopes at the individual level. Each second-stage allocator indicated how much she would allocate to X under each of six possible first-stage divisions. This produces five slopes, or changes in allocations to X for each of the five differences between the first-stage divisions. Our measure of the responsiveness of second-stage allocations is the average responsiveness, or the average of these slopes. We then regress these on the first-stage method (1=Group X Decision) and the second-stage allocator (1=Group Y Allocator). Regression results are reported in Table 3 . We find two significant effects. In particular, the second-stage allocator is significantly more sensitive to differences in first-stage allocations when they are made by X than when they are randomly determined. That is, both Y and Z allocators reciprocate when the first allocation is due to X's choice. The second main effect is that Y's allocations are significantly less sensitive to X's initial allocation than are Z's allocations. As we discuss below, this is primarily due to spectators Z both rewarding and punishing X outcomes, whereas stakeholders Y punish but do not reward. The lack of a reward, therefore, makes Y less responsive on average to X's actions than Z.
Decomposing Preferences
As we saw in Figure 2 , the four treatments can be compared to isolate the effects of different motives. The baseline RZ treatment (Random division, Group Z allocator) can be used to gauge purely distributive preferences. Comparing that treatment with RY, when the first division is made randomly but the stakeholder makes the second allocation, suggests the scope of self-interest in the absence of reciprocity. A comparison of treatments DY and DZ, when X makes the first decision, measures self-interest in the presence of reciprocity. Finally, we can estimate the effects of reciprocal motives by comparing treatments RZ and DZ (in the absence of self-interest) and RY and DY (in the presence of self-interest).
To test for differences in levels, we run a regression of second-stage allocations averaged across possible first-stage divisions. In this regression, however, we suppress the intercept term and include dummies for all four treatments. The parameter estimates on each of the indicator variables provides the statistical differences between that treatment and the three other treatments. We then use the standard errors of these estimates to statistically compare them with each other, which identifies differences from the other treatments. Table 4 , below, summarizes the estimates, t-values and resulting significance levels from those tests. To test for differences in responsiveness, we conduct pair-wise comparisons of slopes across treatments, similar to those reported in Table 4 . Dependent variables are each individual's average slope and independent variables are dummies for all four treatments (again, suppressing the intercept term). Table 5 , below, summarizes the estimates, t-values and resulting significance levels from those comparisons. It appears above that treatment effects are more widespread for levels than slopes. Below we summarize the magnitude of differences in the levels and slopes of second-stage transfers due to self-interest (both with and without reciprocity) and to reciprocity (both with and without selfinterest). The differences are significant at the 5% level, except where otherwise stated.
Self-interest with fairness
In the Random Division condition, stakeholders Y (RY treatment) allocated, on average, $8.23, or almost 20% less than the $10.13 allocated by spectators Z (RZ treatment). With a slope of 0.700, stakeholders were also almost 30% less responsive than spectators, who had a slope of 0.980, under this condition, although this difference is only marginally significant. Thus, self-interest influences allocations in the presence of fairness.
Self-interest with distributive and reciprocity
In the Group X Decision condition, stakeholders Y (DY treatment) allocated, on average, $6.49, or more than 30% less than the $9.66 allocated by spectators (DZ treatment). Stakeholders were also almost 30% less responsive than spectators to differences in first-stage allocations (0.933 versus 1.283). Self-interest, therefore, is a significant force in the presence of both distributive and reciprocal preferences.
Overall, self-interest significantly reduces average allocations to X in both the Random Division and Group X Decision treatments, but the magnitude of its effect on average transfers appears to be somewhat greater in the presence of reciprocity than in its absence. The reduced responsiveness of stakeholders versus spectators, however, is about the same, with or without reciprocity.
Reciprocity with fairness
When the second-stage allocators were spectators, they allocated, on average, amounts insignificantly different from $10, viz., $9.66 in the Group X Decision (DZ) treatment and $10.13
in the Random Division (RZ) treatment. They were, however, about 30% more responsive when X decided the first-stage division (slope of 1.283 in DZ) than when these amounts were random (slope of 0.980 in RZ). The DZ slope coefficient means that when X subjects send their Y counterparts an additional $1, Z subjects reward X subjects with about 30 cents more than the amount dictated by fairness alone. These are the effects of reciprocity when self-interest is not involved.
Reciprocity with self-interest and fairness
If both self-interest and fairness are relevant, the effect of reciprocity is to lower average transfers but to make them more sensitive to differences in first-stage divisions, although the latter effect, while large, is not statistically significant. When the second-stage allocators were stakeholders, they transferred, on average, more than 20% less to their X counterparts when the first-stage division was by Group X Decision ($6.49 in DY) than by Random Division ($8.23 in RY). They were, however, over 30% more responsive to Group X Decisions (slope of 0.933 in DY) than to Random Divisions (slope of 0.700 in RY). Even though Y allocators did not reciprocate in an absolute sense (since they returned only about 93 cents to X subjects in the second stage for every $1 the X subjects transferred in the first stage), Y subjects did act on reciprocal motives as evidenced by a comparison to their transfers in the Random Division treatment where reciprocity has no role. Nevertheless, the difference in slopes between the DY and RY treatments is not significant at conventional levels. We will see in the next section that stakeholders do, in fact, reciprocate, but that this effect is tempered by the fact that they do so asymmetrically, i.e., they differ with respect to negative versus positive reciprocity. This asymmetry (and its absence in the spectator allocations) can be traced to the differential effects of self-interest on reciprocity.
Positive versus Negative Reciprocity
In this section we consider the impact of the identity of the second-stage allocator separately for reward and punishment. Rather than impose cutoff points for first-stage dictator behavior that is deemed worthy of reward or punishment by assumption, we let this be guided by the data.
Specifically, we examine the average responses of impartial Z allocators to X decisions versus their responses to Random divisions (i.e., the mean second-stage allocation for DZ minus that for RZ) for each first-stage division. We find that this difference is negative when the first-stage allocations to Y equal $0, $2 or $4, which we will call Low, indicating negative reciprocity. This difference is positive, however, when first-stage allocations to Y equal $6, $8 and $10, which we will call High, indicating positive reciprocity. Table 7 reports the results of two separate regressions. In the first column, the dependent variable is the average amount allocated to X in the second stage for the case in which X allocates a low amount to Y in the first stage. In the second column, it is the average amount allocated to X in the second stage for the case in which X allocates a high amount to Y in the first stage. this analysis provides no evidence of reward. Actually, an examination of Z allocations does, as previously discussed, reveal a tendency on the part of spectators to reward X generosity, but as we will see below, this is crowded out by the lack of reward exhibited by interested (Y) subjects.
Second, consider the Y allocator variable. It is significantly negative when X makes a low allocation, suggesting that stakeholders punish low allocations more than do spectators. In fact, it is significantly negative even when X makes a high allocation, suggesting that stakeholders fail to reward high allocations compared to spectators. Thus, spectators reward more and punish less than stakeholders.
This last fact can also be seen by comparing transfers of second-stage allocators in decision treatments to those in random division treatments. Table 8 Ninety-seven percent of disinterested spectators (Z players) rewarded generous offers by X subjects compared with only 60% of stakeholders (Y players). A t-test of proportions shows this difference to be a significant (t=2.86, p=.006). Thus, when X has made a generous decision and Y has an opportunity to respond, 40% of the time he is not rewarded and instead X leaves with less money than he would have had the (same) first-stage division been made randomly.
Summary
The preceding analysis produces a number of conclusions. First, fairness here does not differ greatly from inequality aversion based on spectator allocations that come close to equalizing payoffs to subjects from both stages. Studies that contain more contextual elements, such as variable stakes, earned endowments or information about gender, age or needs, often find significant deviations from equality. This study, however, like many others, deliberately omits such elements, in this case, in order to simplify the distributive task and, in that way, to gauge better its impact relative to other forces. Second, implicated stakeholders are less generous than disinterested spectators: self-interest reduces average second-stage allocations by 20-30% and causes second-stage allocators to be about 30% less responsive to first-stage allocations. Third, both spectators and stakeholders are about 30% more responsive to differences in first-stage divisions when X chooses them than when they are random, suggesting a role for reciprocity. Furthermore, our results tend to substantiate Adam Smith's assertion that the stakeholder's gratitude will not always correspond to a kindness, whereas the spectator's will: spectators allocate, on average, $1.28 to X subjects for every $1 the latter send to Y subjects, whereas Y stakeholders barely return the $1. This is because stakeholders are generally less generous and less responsive than spectators in both the random division and in the Group X decision treatments. Further investigation reveals an asymmetry in punishment and reward behavior among spectators and stakeholders. When subject X transfers are low, almost all spectators and stakeholders punish them with lower second-stage allocations than in the random division cases.
But when subject X transfers are high, spectators and stakeholders behave differently. Whereas 97% of spectators reward X generosity, only 60% of interested stakeholders do so.
Conclusion and Discussion
Evidence has been mounting from the laboratory and the field that social preferences are economically relevant and statistically important forces in a variety of settings. They are implicated in involuntary unemployment, strikes and lockouts, product pricing, contract negotiations, and other bargaining behavior. A number of competing motivations have been discovered and formalized.
With this study, we hope to clarify and help unify this stream of research. Moral biases are known to distort the expression of social preferences and to contribute to double standards in their application. This obscuring effect of self-interest has impaired attempts to infer the general principles of social preferences and to gauge the magnitude of their force relative both to one another and to self-interest itself. We employ a new experiment to identify and separate selfinterested, distributive and reciprocal preferences without the confounds that are potentially present in existing games. One benefit of this is to establish more accurate measures of these three motives.
Previous studies have come to conflicting conclusions about their importance, sometimes suggesting that fairness, reciprocity or both have little or no effect. The results reported here allow one to conclude with some confidence that all three forces exert considerable influence on both the level and responsiveness of individual allocation decisions.
In addition, this study helps to clarify the interactions between self-interest, fairness and reciprocity and to quantify these unobscured by moral biases. In this category, one surprising result that emerged is that stakeholders are less reciprocal than spectators. This runs counter to the reasonable expectation that stakeholders might respond more strongly to kindness and unkindness directed toward them than would an unimplicated third party on their behalf. Nevertheless, it is consistent with Smith's conjecture regarding spectators and stakeholders. A related finding concerns the important asymmetry between positive and negative reciprocity that has been seen in previous studies. We find that spectators acting purely on social preferences engage in both reward and punishment, suggesting that the asymmetric responses of stakeholders is not due to an asymmetry in the underlying preference. Instead, the source appears to be a moral bias in the application of reciprocity: stakeholders do not reward but they do punish, indeed, more than spectators. In fact, the results of Dickinson (2001) and Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003) might be seen as indicating that such behavior is consistent with more efficient incentive systems.
They find that agents are more likely to respond to negative than to positive incentives. The contrast between spectator and stakeholder reciprocity is potentially helpful is building descriptive models.
But it is a difference that might also be important to consider for prescriptive analysis. Social choice models built on the impartial spectator model, for example, should consider the positive reciprocity motive, even if it does not figure prominently among stakeholders.
We believe that investigation into spectator preferences is an important direction for further research. Such investigations have at least three advantages. First, they allow one to understand and estimate better the sometimes intricate and interacting social preferences, which self-interest might otherwise obscure. This holds the potential for informing theoretical work on how social preferences came to be and how they are currently instantiated. We believe that this methodology can be viewed as a way to find out more about what behavior is deemed fair and unfair. Second, by isolating the effects of motives apart from self-interest and comparing them with behavior of stakeholders, this approach enables one to identify more precisely the effects of self-interest itself, the central construct in economics. Finally, impartial spectatorship has a long and honored tradition in social choice and moral philosophy. This empirical agenda, therefore, has implications for normative studies, including theoretical work as well as policy research.
